Essay on the Development of Irrigation in India

In this essay we will discuss about the development of Irrigation in India.

Water is to land what food is to human body. The part played by irrigation in Indian agriculture is all the greater due to the uncertainty, unequal distribution, as well as the insufficiency of rainfall. In large parts of the country, rainfall is the only source of water-supply and its failure causes almost famine conditions.

That is why “Irrigation works… although almost un-known in Northern Europe, have existed in India…from time immemorial.”

The oldest and the most famous was the Cauvery delta system of canals in Madras which Sir Arthur Cotton strengthened and improved in 1835-1836, and the success of which encouraged him to propose the great Godavari works which he afterwards constructed. Most of the weirs on the Tungbhadra were constructed by the Hindu King, Krishna Raya, at the beginning of the 16th century.

In Northern India, the Mahommadans made frequent attempts to utilise the water of the river Jamuna. The western Jamuna Canal was started by Feroz Shah Tuglak in the middle of the 14th Century while the Eastern Jamuna Canal was made at the beginning of the 18th Century.

In the Punjab, the small Hash canal was constructed by early rulers for carrying water from the river Ravi to Lahore and Amritsar on very much the same alignment as the present Upper Bari Doab. Some of these early works were destroyed by internal wars before the establishment of the British rule, and the number and utility of those which were left was much diminished by want of repairs.

Although, the earliest results attained by direct govt. agency on the Cauvery, Godavari and Jamuna works were sufficiently encouraging, the East India Company was reluctant to commit itself to any extensive scheme of state irrigation works.

In the words of Sir Arthur Cotton, the policy of the company was to “do nothing, have nothing done, let nobody do anything. Bear any loss. Let the people die of famine, let hundred of lakhs be lost in revenue for want of water… rather than do anything.”

However, the series of devastating famines which visited the country at regular intervals soon forced the company to give attention to the question of providing irrigation facilities. A General Superintendent of Irrigation was appointed in 1823 and the repair and improvement of the old works was taken in hand. The Western Jamuna Canal was re-opened in 1821 and the Eastern Jamuna in 1830.

In 1842, the construction of Ganges Canal was begun but, owing to delays caused by the Afghan and Sikh wars, it was not opened till 1854. Another of the great works of Northern India undertaken by the East India Company was the Upper Bari Doab. The construction of this canal was undertaken soon after the annexation of the Punjab but was not opened until 1859.

While these works were being constructed in Northern India, the Madras Engineers were engaged in the development and re-modelling of the old irrigation works in the delta of the Cauvery river. The success of this scheme led Sir Arthur Cotton to propose a similar scheme on the Godavari river which was sanctioned in 1846 while the work on the river Krishna was Completed in 1855.

Apart from these larger works, various smaller schemes were also undertaken under orders of the East India Company and these included the construction of small canals in the Dehradun and Rohilkhand area of U.P. and the repair of various tanks in South India.

All these irrigation schemes were carried out of revenue surpluses and, though profitable, their construction imposed a strain on the resources of the company. It was, therefore, suggested that the construction of large irrigation works, like that of railways, could be most advantageously entrusted to private enterprise.

The real reason, however, lay in the fact that, after the heyday of the Industrial Revolution, safe and profitable investment outlets had narrowed in England while railway investments in territories outside Britain’s political control had become risky. The Government, therefore, obliged by providing a 5% guarantee on investment in irrigation undertaken by private British companies.

Two companies were floated in England to take up these ambitious schemes, section by section. The first company, known as the East India Irrigation and Canal Company, was formed in 1858 with the intention of constructing irrigation and navigation canals in Orissa. The company soon got into difficulties; the govt. began by giving a subsidy and ended by taking over the concern in 1869 at an exorbitant rate.

The second company, known as the Madras Irrigation Com­pany, was formed in 1863. It rarely succeeded in meeting its working expenses. In addition to the guaranteed interest of 5%, a large sum was advanced to the company free of interest and, ultimately, it was taken over by the govt. in 1882.

In the light of this experience, it was realised that the construction and control of such irrigation works could not be conveniently entrusted to private enterprise. Thus was initiated, under the viceroyalty of Lord Lawrence, a new policy under which works that gave a fair promise of proving directly remunerative, were to be constructed by the state from loan funds.

State initiative and control gave irrigation projects the benefits of proper financial aid and well-coordinated technical knowledge and experience the lack of which had led to the failure of state-aided private companies.

Between 1862—1882, five big ‘Loans works’, namely, the Sir hind Canal (Punjab), the Lower Ganges and the Agra Canal (U.P.), the Lower Swat Project (N.W.F.P, now in Pakistan) and the Dam at Kharagvasla near Poona were constructed by the govt.

In all, a total of £ 12 million was spent on irrigation works up to 1880, while the total irrigated area amounted to 29 million acres. It may be noted that in the case of Bombay Deccan, Berar and Central provinces … areas prone to frequent famine, the irrigated area formed an insignificant proportion of the total cultivated area.

The provinces which were better served by irrigation owed the most im­portant part of their large irrigation works to the period before 1860. Thus, the four important works of North India, the Upper Bari Doab in the Punjab, the two Jamuna Canals and the magnificent Ganges Canal, were all constructed before the Crown took over the administration of the country.

Similarly, the irrigation works in the Deltas of the Krishna, Cauvery and Godavari were constructed before 1858. The progress made in the construction of irrigation works between 1859—80 was thus extremely inadequate and unsatisfactory. Two factors were responsible for this.

These were, firstly, the unfortunate belief that the key to the solution of the famine problem lay more in the extension of railways than in the development of irrigation and, secondly, the financial difficulties of the govt. which stood in the way of its raising sufficient funds for investment in irrigation works.

The terrible Madras Famine of 1877, however, gave Sir Arthur Cotton an opportunity to rouse the attention of the British public to the un-wisdom of neglecting irrigation in India.

The famine commission of 1880, drawing pointed attention to the importance of irrigation, remarked that “among the means that may be adopted for giving India direct protection from famines arising from drought, the first place must unquestionably be assigned to works of irrigation.”

The com­mission further laid down that the value of irrigation works was to be judged first by “the direct protection afforded by them in years of drought” and, secondly, by the great services they rendered in imparting “certainty to all agricultural operations, increasing the out-turn per acre of the crops, and enabling more valuable crops to be grown.”

Following these recommendations, a number of canal irrigation schemes were pushed forward in the Punjab, Bengal, Bombay and Sind. In the Punjab, the extension of the western Jamuna Canal and the construction of the Chenab, Lower Sohag, Para Inundation Canal and the Sidnai Canal was sanctioned. In Bengal, the completion of the Orissa Canal system was undertaken.

The Betwa Canal in U.P. was the first protective work to be completed out of the newly created Famine Relief and Insurance Fund. Other protective works completed by 1900 included the famous Nira and Periyar Gokak, and Mhawad canal system in the Deccan and the Jamrao and Western Nara canals in Sind.

The Sarda Canal in Oudh could not be sanctioned as “more urgent irrigation works were needed elsewhere.” The overall result of these irrigation works, taken together with protective works, was that the canal-irrigated area in India increased from 10.6 million acres in 1878—79 to 15.3 million acres in 1896—97-an increase of 50%.

This increase, though satisfactory in itself, fell far short of the needs of the country or even of what could have been achieved had the govt. given the same attention to irrigation as it bestowed upon the railways. Even after the emphatic declaration of the Famine Commission in favour of irrigation, the first place con­tinued to be given to the railways.

For example, up to the end of 1902—3, the total expenditure by the govt. on major and minor works of irrigation amounted to nearly Rs. 43 crores. In contrast, the total outlay on the state and guaranteed railways had amounted, by 30 June 1905, to Rs, 359 crores.

This ‘unwise extravagance’ in regard to railways and ‘unwise niggardliness’ in relation to irrigation cannot be explained by the financial considerations of net return on investment or the paucity of funds.

As the Famine Commission of 1898 concluded, “Even apart from their value in increasing the wealth of the country in ordinary years and in preventing or mitigating famines in years of drought” the results of irrigation works “regarded merely from the direct financial return on the money invested was a great advantage, to the State.”

The major irrigation works, on an average, yielded a net revenue of 7% and loans were available in London at 3.4%. On the other hand, the large majority of railway lines, with the exception of a few, were a drain on the exchequer, the average loss sustained by the govt. being an estimated Rs. 1 crore per year. Obviously, financial considerations could not have been the basis of the govt’s preference for railways.

Similarly, Dr. Anstey’s argument that the limitations of knowledge and skill and the fears of a possible exhaustion of river water were among the factors responsible for restricting in investment in irrigation cannot be accepted because by 1900, India had utilised only a fraction of her river-water potential while engineers like Arthur Cotton were available who were willing and able to face the technical challenge involved in the construction of irrigation works.

It may also be argued that further investment in irrigation works before the First World War would have swollen total expenditure and, therefore, aggravated the problem of rise in prices. But even this was not a compelling argument for two reasons.

In the first place, the stimulus for the rise in the prices came, to a considerable extent, through rise in the prices of Indian exports and an increase in expenditure could not have very much affected export prices.

In the second place, a large part of the increased expenditure would have leaked abroad in the form of increased imports of capital goods and in the form of salaries of technical personnel.

R.C. Dutt thinks that English men made a ‘geographical mistake’ in that “the British nation, more familiar with railways than canals in their country, did not adequately realise the great importance of irrigation in India,” and, there­fore, did not expand irrigation with the same keenness with which railways were multiplied.

The common man in Britain might have been ignorant about Indian conditions, but the British administrators were certainly not. The truth is that the public works policy of the govt. was influenced by ‘Imperial and commercial’ considerations. Railways benefitted the trade—import of manufactured goods and export of raw-materials….while canals helped agriculture in which the English trader had little interest.

That is why the govt. gave priority to railways over canals and men like Arthur Cotton and Lawrence could not make any headway against the general and ‘deadening indifference of the govt.’

Besides, being based on commercial considerations, the policy of the govt. was defective in that the choice of irrigation schemes was made on the financial consideration of whether they would pay. Protective works could not be financed out of current revenues or borrowed funds.

The Famine Insurance Fund, which was the only source of finance for such works, was too meagre to ‘support any large programme of protective works.’ The irrigation policy of the govt., therefore, bore no relation, till the end of the 19th century, to the needs of the situation.

It was only after 1900, when an enormous network of railways had been laid for meeting Britain’s trade requirements, that funds as well as attention began to be spared for irrigation.

The appointment of the Irrigation Commission in 1901 was, therefore, not merely an indication of govt’s, readiness to devote greater attention to irrigation but it also marked a fundamental change in the thinking of the govt. on the purpose of irrigation works in India. It did not mean stopping further extension of produc­tive works which the govt. constructed ‘as a matter of business.’

It only meant the beginning of a move in the direction of providing irrigation facilities to those areas “where no works of productive class were possible and which must be protected if at all, at a certain cost to the revenues.”

The commission pointed out that irrigation works has not, in the past, received the attention that they deserved, that there was still great scope for the extension of remunerative irrigation works in some parts of the country, that there had been over the past 25 years very little increase in the area covered by minor irrigation and that besides extension of state protective works, much could be achieved by construction of private works such as wells through state advances and revenue concessions.

A 20 years plan, involving a total expenditure of Rs. 44 crores, was drawn up by the commission. Of this sum, Rs. 15 crores, were proposed for investment on produc­tive works, Rs. 20 crores on protective works and rupees 9’crores on intermediate works.

Following the recommendations of the commission, the Govt. began to pay greater attention to irrigation. Formerly, greater portion of famine grant was set apart for railways, but now it was decided to allocate the whole of this sum to protective works. In 1910, this sum was found to be insufficient and a further annual contribution, not exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs, from the revenues was sanctioned for this purpose.

The chief work completed before the 1st World War was the Triple Canal Project in the Punjab. (Upper Jhelum, Upper Chenab and Lower Bari Doab) Work on the Lower Jhelum Canal was also completed although the scheme had been sanctioned in 1888. Most of the other work carried out were famine protective storage works.

These included the Mahanadi, Wainganga, Tendula and Ram Tek Canal projects in the central provinces and the Ken, Dhosan, Ghaghar, and the Gorai Canals in U.P., and the Bhandaradara Dam and the Bhatgarh Dams in the Bombay Deccan. The Total capital invested in irrigation works rose from Rs. 42 crores in 1900 to Rs. 78 crores in 1920.

The end of the war saw the world entering upon a period of unprecedented prosperity. Wages rose and so did prices and, with these, the value of land and food grains also went very high.

Fortunes were made out of land, more particularly where irrigation made it possible to grow superior crops. The result was that projects which had previously appeared doubtful from the financial point of view now offered prospects of high returns.

Besides, under the reforms of 1919, ir­rigation became a reserved provincial subject and the new provincial govts. were keen to push forward irrigation schemes. What is more, accepting the recom­mendations of the Irrigation Commission, the distinction between ‘productive’ and ‘protective’ works was also abolished in 1922. Now all works could be financed out of loans.

The stage was, therefore, set for a more rapid expansion of irrigation facilities in the country. Certain large projects were hurriedly prepared and sanctioned in quick succession. These were the Sukkur Barrage scheme in Sind, the Sutlej Valley scheme to irrigate part of the Punjab, Bikaner and Bahawalpur, and the Sarda Canal Project in U.P.

These were all first-rate though controversial schemes and their total cost was almost equal to the total expenditure incurred till then on both productive and unproductive works. Other works completed were the Cauvery Mettur Project, The Nira Right Bank Canal and the Damodar Canal.

Another notable development of the period was the establishment, in 1931, of the Central Board of Irrigation for the purpose of coordinating research in irrigation.

Although the II World War left very little time and resources for the construction of any large works, still certain new projects, especially the Tungbhadra project, were taken in hand. During the period of the war were also established the Central Water-power Irrigation and Navigation Commission and the Central Ground Water Organisation.

The first was required, among other things, to coor­dinate schemes of irrigation, water-power generation, navigation, and, if so required for the construction of new schemes. The second was meant to conduct research in the utilisation of underground water.

The partition of the country was a severe blow to India in so far as irrigation facilities were concerned. It saddled India with 82% of the population but only 69% of the total irrigated area of the undivided country, many major irrigation works having been left in west Punjab and Sind.

The gravity of the situation can be realised from the fact that in Pakistan, 45.2% of the net sown area was irrigated while the corresponding percentage in Indian Union was only 18.9%.

It was only after Independence that irrigation began to get the attention it really deserves in an agricultural country. It was only now fully understood that “large-scale development of irrigation and power helps to re-build the agricultural economy and pave the way for the rapid industrialisation of the country.”

An ambitious programme of multipurpose projects was undertaken for a planned extension of irrigation facilities in the country. The First Plan mainly included schemes which had already been taken up in the period prior to the commencement of planning. In the Second Plan, there was distinct shift towards medium schemes.

However, since a large number of schemes continued to be under construction even at the end of the second plan, the emphasis during the Third Plan was on completion of continuing schemes. As such, very few new schemes were taken up in the Third Plan. All told, during these three plans, a total investment of Rs. 1300 crores was made on the construction of 295 major and minor irrigation works.

As a result, total irrigated area increased from 56 million acres before 1950—51 to 87 million acres in 1965-66. Major schemes completed included the Bhakra Nagal, Damodar Valley, Hirakud, Kosi, Koyna, Krishna, Chambal, Rihand, Tungbhadra, Mayurakshi and Lower Bhowani.

Though the efforts of the govt. were concentrated on the construction of canals, yet other means of irrigation were not altogether ignored. From times immemorial, wells had been tried as a method of irrigation in the Punjab, U.P., Madras, and parts of Bombay.

These were privately owned and the views of the govt. were well summed up by the Agricultural Commission when it said that “the construction of wells is essentially a matter of private enterprise.”

Amazingly, the area under well irrigation remained stationary for a very long period despite the encouragement given by the govt. through loans under the Land Improvement Act. In 1880 the Famine Commission estimated the total well-irrigated area at 10.8 million acres; the Irrigation Commission (1901) put the figure at not less than 12.8 million acres. It was 11.7 million acres in 1925—26 and 11.37 million acres in 1933.

The reason probably is that with the extension of canal irrigation in several parts of the country, many old wells became useless and were no more used. However, after the Bengal famine, greater official en­couragement began to be given to the construction and repair of wells.

Under the Grow More Food campaign and subsequently the plans, liberal help was given in the shape of loans to encourage cultivators to construct or repair their own wells. As a result, the area irrigated by wells rose to 18.2 million acres in 1960—61.

The Ganges valley Tube well Irrigation Scheme marked a new development in the practice of well irrigation. Under that scheme, 1300 tube-wells were con­structed during the three years 1935—37. Since then, the number of tube wells went on rising. At the end of the Third Plan, the number of tube-wells in the country had risen to 80,000.

Tank irrigation is conspicuous by its absence in the Punjab but was of con­siderable importance in Madras, Deccan, Mysore, and Bihar. The reasons for the concentration of tanks in the South are obvious. Firstly, the rivers in the South are not snow-fed and depend solely on rainfall.

Secondly, there are many streams which cause floods during the monsoons but later dry up. Their water can be stored and floods prevented through construction of tanks. The land is uneven and its bed rocky, making it very difficult to construct canals or dig wells.

While the smaller tanks were constructed and maintained by private enterprise, the larger ones were always maintained as state irrigation works. These irrigated over 8 million acres in 1900. After the report of the Irrigation Com­mission, the Govt. began to make greater effort to renovate and repair existing tanks so as to make them serviceable.

The Bombay Govt. appointed a special officer to look after the ‘Bhandaras’ in Nasik and Khandesh districts. The area irrigated by tanks, therefore, rose to about 11.5 million acres in 1960—61.

“These Irrigation works made for security of life, increased the yields and the value of lands and the revenue derived from it. They lessened the cost of famine relief and helped to civilize whole regions. In addition, they yielded a handsome profit to the govt.” But irrigation was not always an un-mixed blessing.

In the absence of a very good drainage system, water-logging and Malaria often followed. In U.P. and the Punjab, water logging often led to the rising to the surface of a saline substance called ‘Kalar’ which made the land almost un- cultivable.