In this essay we will discuss about the land revenue system during British rule in India. After reading this essay you will learn about: 1. Main Features of the Land Revenue System 2. Land Revenue System in Bengal 3. Land Revenue System in Ryotwari Areas 4. Land Revenue System in Mahalwari Areas of United Provinces 5. Summing Up of the Land Revenue Policy 6. Consequences of the Land Revenue System.

List of Essays the Land Revenue System, during British Rule in India

Essay Contents:

  1. Essay on the Main Features of Land Revenue System
  2. Essay on the Land Revenue System in Bengal
  3. Essay on the Land Revenue System in Ryotwari Areas
  4. Essay on the Land Revenue System in Mahalwari Areas of United Provinces
  5. Essay on the Summing Up of Land Revenue Policy
  6. Essay on the Consequences of Land Revenue System

Essay # 1. Main Features of the Land Revenue System:

ADVERTISEMENTS:

In the early history of all countries, land was either the only or the main source of revenue. In modern times, although many other sources of income have been developed, yet land continues to be taxed in one or the other form. This is true of India as well but with the difference that till recently, the state in India derived a much larger percentage of its income from land than from any other source.

Under the ancient Hindu kings, the share which the state could take from the landowner was limited to 1/6 of the produce paid usually in kind but, in some cases, in cash. The early Muslim rulers made no change in the system so that the old village communities continued to function through the ages right up to the advent of the British.

To Sher Shah, however, belongs the credit of introducing the system of measurement as the basis of assessment. He had the lands classified, standard yields assessed, and revenue fixed at 1/3 of the average on all classes of land.

Sher Shah’s reforms became the basis of Akbar’s policy with the difference that he proceeded to convert the grain rates into cash rates based on the average prices of 19 years prevailing before the settlement. With the decline of the Moghul power, there came into existence different rulers in different parts of India with more or less exorbitant claims.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

In the general confusion, which prevailed in the 18 century, no ruler was safe in his position, and every one was in need of resources to fight his wars. Understandably, there were frequent cases of excessive demands.

Instead of trying to remove this injustice and oppression, the British found it convenient to claim the same unjust rights on the ground of precedent. Thus were introduced in different provinces of India different systems of land revenue—all so designed as to collect “the largest amount of money in the quickest possible time.”

Essay # 2. Land Revenue System in Bengal:

The first settlement made by the British was in Bengal. After a fruitless attempt at farming the revenues, Lord Cornwallis introduced in 1793 the Permanent settlement under which the state demand was fixed at 90% of the rental. The sum so fixed was unalterable for ever. A similar settlement was later introduced in North Madras and the district of Benares where a class of Zamindars similar to that of Bengal existed.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

To demand 90% of the rental was certainly exorbitant. In the words of Dr. Mukerjee, the company based their revenue demand on their own needs and not on the facts of actual Zamindari receipts or rents of these days. However, the landlord had his compensation in as much as his revenue was fixed for ever.

He now knew the exact amount to a pie which he was to pay as revenue. But the ryots—the actual tillers—were not protected. They were often ousted by the Zamindar who hoped to get a higher rent from another tenant. All he had to do was to allow the revenue to fall into arrears, have his estate auctioned, and then buy it under a false name.

Consequently, a large number of estates were advertised for sale at auction for arrears of revenue. Many ascribed it to the ‘stupidity and rascality’ of the ryots in not paying the rents. Laws were, therefore, passed which made the ryots liable to personal arrest and imprisonment. This secured to the govt. “the realisation of its own revenue and enabled the zamindars to squeeze the last pie from their tenants”.

No wonder, rents reached sky high. This may be seen form the fact that, in 1793, revenue was fixed at 90% of the rental; by the end of the 19th Century, rents had risen to such an extent that revenue came to a mere 28% of the rental. This is an index both of the prosperity of the Zamindar as well as the injustice done to other parts of India where assessments were much heavier.

Essay # 3. Land Revenue System in Ryotwari Areas:

Madras:

The Ryotwari settlement was first introduced in Baramahal in 1792 and gradual­ly extended to other parts of Madras. In the words of John Tucker, the object of this settlement was “to obtain for the state the utmost that the land could yield in the shape of rent.” The first assessments were, therefore, heavy and oppressive, the state demanding about ½ of the estimated gross produce of the land.

Despite pleadings of Munro, revenue could not be reduced because “orders were received from England for an additional annual remittance of a million sterling accom­panied by a threat that the Directors would have the question of reducing the establishments in their own hands in case of disobedience”.

After a lengthy debate and judicial enquiry, assessment was reduced to 1/3 of the produce. Even this reduced demand was found to be oppressive as it “represented the entire economic rent in many villages and fields”. The govt., however, was unsparing and used all methods including torture to ensure prompt realisation. The result was disastrous.

The province of Madras became a scene of oppression and distress un-parallel even in that age. Agriculture was ruined Famine followed famine. Epidemics, malnutrition and starvation became common place. The impoverishment of the peasantry led the administration to moderate its demand.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

Extensive settlement was ordered in 1855 when the state’s demand was reduced to 1/2 of the net produce instead of a share of the gross produce as before. Settlements were made for 30 years subject to enhancement at the expiry of the current settlement.

The cultivator had no right of appeal to any tribunal; he had either to pay or quit. According to Louis Mallet, “the 50% of the net produce was a mere paper instruction, a fiction which had very little to do with the actual facts of the administration. In practice, the rates levied often absorbed the whole rental and not infrequently……….. encroached on profits also.”

Besides, the door of exploitation was kept open by not providing specific and definite grounds for the enhancement of the state demand. The terrible Madras famine of 1877 proved fatally how little the new settlement had added to the betterment of the cultivators.

In subsequent years, the revenue demand was reduced and based on more scientific grounds. Two principles were introduced. The first was that assess­ment was on the land and did not depend upon the kind of crop grown.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

The soil was classified according to its productivity, normal output of each class of soil ascertained after a series of experiments, and this output was converted into money value not at the current rate, but at the average of the prices prevailing during 20 years immediately preceeding the settlement.

Under the second prin­ciple, various deductions were made to cover the cost of cultivation as well as cartage while estimating the net produce of each holding. Of this net produce, 50% was claimed as the maximum revenue which was not increased except in case of rise in prices. Besides, the govt. claimed no share of the increase in profits due to the improvements made by the cultivator.

Bombay:

Temporary settlements were tried in Bombay in the early stages of the British rule but over assessments led to unhappy results. It was in 1825 that settlement on the Madras principle was ordered and govt. demand was fixed at 55% of the produce.

The new settlement was faulty; the estimates of produce were wrong; the revenue demand was excessive, and, therefore, the settlement operations ended in oppression. By 1835, the province had so deeply sunk in poverty that a resurvey was ordered. It abandoned the basis of produce estimates and substituted value of land as the basis of assessment.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

Accordingly, land was divided into nine different classes according to quality and settlement was made for thirty years directly with the ryots, by-passing the village communities. The curse of over assessment, how­ever, did not end. In the words of Sir W. Hunter, the govt. demand hardly left “enough food to the cultivator to support himself and his family throughout the year.”

Between 1835—1896, three settlements were made during which govt. demand was raised by 30% at each settlement of 30 years period. The produce of the land did not increase either in quantity or value. The natural consequence of this disproportionate enhancement was the ruin of the cultivators.

Unable to pay, many “abandoned their homes and fled into the neighbouring native states. Large tracts of land was thrown out of cultivation, and in some districts” no more than 1/3 of the cultivable area remained in occupation.

Essay # 4. Land Revenue System in Mahalwari Areas of United Provinces:

The first regular assessments were completed under regulation IX of 1833 when the revenue demand was fixed at between 65—70% of the net assets to be calculated on the basis of area tilled, crops sown, and rent demanded. On account of the high pitch of the revenue assessment, the country remained in a state of perpetual poverty.

The situation eased a little when the Saharanpur Settlement Rule was introduced in 1855. The most redeeming feature of this rule was that revenue was fixed at 50% of the net assets. While calculating the assets, the settlement Officer was required to study rent actually claimed by the Landlords.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

The Saharanpur Rule though marked an improvement, “did not give wholly satis­factory results, and in some cases, it undoubtedly resulted in over assessment mainly because it gave too much scope in estimating the yield of the land.”

It was only in 1866 that the practice of ‘actual’ as opposed to ‘prospective’ rent was introduced. As a result of the high pitch of revenue demanded, considerable area was transferred from the agriculturists to the non-agriculturists, the village communities having been the chief sufferers.

Punjab:

According to Thornburn, the first effect of the British occupation of the Punjab was over-assessment. This may be seen from the fact that the land revenue of the Punjab was £8.20 lakh in 1847—48 but ten years later in 1857—58, it had increased to £14.50 lakhs. It was in the settlement of 1871 that the principle was accepted that the revenue should not exceed half the estimated value of the net produce of land.

In estimating the net produce, the rent paid by the tenants at will for similar land in the neighbouring area was the principal guide. The settlement was moderate and revenue and cess together did not exceed 45% of the net assets. In 1928, it was further reduced to – of the net assets.

Essay # 5. Summing Up of the Land Revenue Policy:

The land revenue policy, as evolved and worked by the British, was defective in several respects. The major evil was the immoderately high pitch of assessment which, sometimes, absorbed the whole of the economic rent.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

According to R.C. Dutt, as a general rule, at the end of the last century, the revenue demand varied between 5—6% of the gross produce in Bengal, 8—10% in Northern India, 12—31% in Madras and probably higher in Bombay.

In the case of inferior lands, subsistence and uneconomic holdings, the govt. demand went to the extent of touching upon wages of the cultivator and the profits on his capital. This amounted to confiscation of private property in land and transformation of the peasant-proprietor into a virtual serf of the state.

Paradoxically, the govt. did not admit the high pitch of revenue demand. It rather held the view that the rise in revenue was mainly due to extension of cultivation and rise in land values brought about by agricultural prosperity. That it was not so is proved by the fact that between 1885—86 to 1912—13, cultivated area increased by 21.5% while revenue receipts rose by 45.1 %.

As for the increase in the market value of land, this was “more an index of population pressure rather than of agricultural prosperity.” The great demand for land from people, most of whom had no alternative source of income, had driven up the price of land out of all relation to its income-generating capacity.

There is, therefore, no doubt of the high pitch of land revenue. This is confirmed by the undue pressure including torture that had to be exerted for its collection.

Further, the large number of holdings sold for arrers and the increasing number of distress sales and mortgages of land were all indications of the excessively high pitch of land assessment. The extent of famine and starvation deaths in the country also point to the same fact.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

The second important defect was that the govt. demand on land was uncertain and fluctuating because of periodic revisions, and that its enhancement was not based on any definite and specific rules.

It could be and was increased by large amounts on vague, indefinite, shadowy and unreal grounds which were not understandable to the cultivator but which provided ample opportunity to the revenue officers to exercise their arbitrary powers at the time of resettlement, unhindered by any judicial check.

The third was the rigidity of the system. The old Indian demand on the land was elastic. It was a certain share in the produce to be paid in kind. The amount to be paid thus varied with the season. Under the British, however, revenue began to be collected rigidly and inflexibly.

Whether there was prosperity or distress, crop or no crop, the cultivators had to pay their revenue regularly and punctually lest they should loose their land and the state accepted it without considering whether the cultivators paid it out of their income from land or with borrowed money.

The fourth was that the burden of revenue was not equitably distributed in all the provinces. Rather, there were wide variations from province to province and even within the same province. For example, land revenue per head of population ranged all the way from about 0.56 paise in Bengal to Rs. 2/- in Bombay, Rs. 2.56 in Sind, Rs. 1.60 in Madras and Rs. 1.30 in Punjab.

Again, in the temporarily settled areas of Bengal, the rate was 150% higher than that in the permanently settled areas. Within the permanently settled areas, the maximum rate was seven times the minimum. The unavoidable conclusion follows that there was no single and uniform basis of assessment and that the burden of land revenue was arbitrarily distributed.

Essay # 6. Consequences of the Land Revenue System:

ADVERTISEMENTS:

As was to be expected, the land revenue system, evolved by the British, led to disastrous consequences in the field of Indian agriculture. The high pitch of land assessment, by ciphoning away a large part of the cultivators possible savings, drained the countryside of its capital, hindered capital investment in Land and, in general, checked expenditure on agricultural improvements.

The excessive land revenue would not have inflicted so deep an injury if only a part of it had been spent in improving agricultural techniques as in Japan or on irrigation as the former Indian rulers did. Instead, a large part of this revenue was exported out of the country and did not ‘fructify’ in India. Thus, the moisture of revenue raised from the Indian soil descended as fertilizing rain largely on England.

Enhancement of revenue by the govt. served as an excuse for the Zamindar to increase his rents to an even larger extent. In this connection, R.C. Dutt points out that where land revenue was fixed as a proportion of rent, the revenue officials persuaded and even compelled those Zamindars, who might otherwise have wished to be lenient, to screw up their rentals so that the govt. was enabled to impose larger assessment.

Heavy assessments increased the intensity and frequency of famines by produc­ing a general resourcelessness in the countryside. The peasant was unable to save anything in good years as insurance against years of bad harvest and, consequently, fell an easy prey to famines and death. In-fact, it was the lack of his staying power that transformed every drought into a famine.

Constant revisions of assessment, which involved fresh appraisal of individual plots of land, often led to taxation of improvements made by the cultivator himself. This took away from him all incentive to exert himself and to increase agricultural productivity.

In the absence of large scale increase in agricultural production, the high pitch of assessment combined with the rigidity of its collection, drove the hard- pressed ryot into the clutches of the moneylenders, never to be a free man again.

The rigidity and inconvenience of the mode of collection also compelled many a ryot to make forced sales of his produce so that a glut was caused in the market leading to an artificial lowering of prices to his great disadvantage.

Heavy assessments made the cultivator nervous. He was unable to decide whether to work hard or take life easy because he was not sure if he would be allowed to reap the fruit of his labour. It was this uncertainty which made the Indian ryot indolent and was responsible for the general absence of a spirit of enterprise and initiative in the country.

The result was stagnation and even decay of agriculture and the existence of all-pervading poverty in Indian villages. Land revenue policy is, thus, the villain which played foul with Indian agriculture, then as now, the national industry of the country. At its door lies the major share of the blame for the ruin of agriculture, the poverty of the Indian people and the famines that devastated the country in the 19th century.

One question still remains to be answered. Why, in-spite of forceful pleadings by many English men and vehement protests from Indians, land revenue was not reduced? The answer lies in understanding the working of the ‘economic drain’ from India to England.

Financially, the drain was met directly from the govt. revenues whose largest constituent was land revenue. But economically, the drain had to take the form of excess exports which, in the absence of any industry, could be created only by compelling the ryot to sell as large a portion of his produce as possible.

This was done through the mechanism of land revenue which forced the peasant to pay for the drain as well as provide the agricultural products through which it was remitted abroad.

The result was that he was, on the one hand, impoverished and, on the other, starved of food grains which he was compelled to sell and the country to export because of the dual pressure of land revenue and drain. It is, therefore, that revenue was not only not reduced but regularly revised upwards. It is a different matter that poverty and famines stalked the land.